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People who study American constitutionalism refer often to religion as
an analogy, or treat constitutionalism as a form of civil religion. I want to
take this analogy to religion somewhat more seriously than seems to have
been fashionable during the bicentennial year.
The religion analogy sometimes indicates that people "reverence" the
Constitution (perhaps as an emanation of the democratic deity The People)
much as they reverence the Bible as God's word in mainstream religion, that
they attribute great power to law, as a kind of analog to the Holy Spirit, an
emanation of divinity, that there is an aura of spirituality to discussions of
the document and of the rights that it supposedly guarantees, that the
Framers are like prophets, and that the document gets exegesis in a spirit
like that of biblical exegesis.
The conclusion that seems most obviously to follow from the analogy
might be something like: "one should not be too rationalistic in trying to
understand what the Constitution is all about and especially in trying to
understand how people react to the United States Supreme Court." The
analogy might be to the cult of the British Royal Family and its role in
British social and political life.
There is an implicit theory of what religion is and how it functions in
social structure that makes the analogy seem interesting and important, and
makes this seem a plausible conclusion to draw from it. That theory seems
to be something like: a religion is a body of metaphysical beliefs, moral
precepts and ritual practices, irrationally founded and self-consciously shared
across some group. The role of religion in society would be something like:
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shared religious beliefs, precepts, and rituals define patterns of daily life,
bind the members of a society together, and give the society its identity as
against others, such as foreigners and internal deviants (people who profane
the constitutional faith, say, like maybe communists except that they are
always wrapping themselves in it). As long as everyone is being tolerant
(an important proviso), religion is at worst a harmless and at best an enor-
mously socially valuable and spiritually valid part of communal life.
But this British Royal Family model of constitutionalism as civil
religion is only part of the story. We also use the analogy to understand
obedience to the Supreme Court, and here its meaning is that obedience
goes far beyond what one would expect if one saw it as based on rational
agreement, on force, or on contract.
This notion is summed up in the juxtaposition of Justice Brewer's
famous remark in the Debs case,' that the strikers dispersed voluntarily as
soon as they heard that the court had decided their action was illegal, with
Justice Holmes' contemporaneous remark that issues of the kind involved
in that very strike ultimately came down to matters of policy about which
judges of different economic sympathies might well disagree.2 The idea of
religion seems useful to understand the ability of the Court to command
obedience to politically controversial decisions when it lacks what we think
of as the standard instruments of power.
But what kind of religious belief is analogous to this aspect of
constitutionalism? How does the analogy to religion help us understand the
place of constitutionalism in American political culture? The Supreme
Court does not fit the British Royal Family model of civil religion, because
the cult of the BRF followed its loss of real political power.
The Supreme Court is, for those whose attitude we compare to that of
the religious, the authoritative source of true interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, and its determinations are understood to have binding force over the
members of the society. The idea of binding force clearly has both a moral
component-people believe they ought to obey the law-and a practical
one---decrees are backed to some extent by state coercion.
It is of course easy to see the Court as a priestly corps, so that it is like
the Pope when he speaks ex cathedra. But then we have to add the element
of state force. The correct analogy might seem to be a theocracy, say
Khomeini's Iran. But here the problem is that in our usual model of
theocracy, the priestly corps has all political power, whereas in our society
1. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
2. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1894).
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it is clear that the Court has limited power. There are some political acts
we do not expect it to do, and if it tried to do them it would probably fail
to impose itself on the other elements in the political system.
Another analogy would be to the Delphic oracle, which gave answers,
in the form of sophisticated riddles clearly based on inside information, to
political questions brought from far and wide. But here there is lacking
both the coercive aspect and the crucial feature of textual interpretation, with
the authority of the practitioners based on a combination of supposed
reverence for the source of the text and belief in the neutral or at least
impersonal character of the interpretive process.
How about the practice of divination, by looking into the entrails of
animals or interpreting the flight of birds, that seems to have had an
institutionalized place in the political systems of ancient Greece and Rome?
The priest or priestly corps in these cases seems to be able to decisively
control events through the interpretive process, without having a claim to
unlimited political power. For example, I vaguely remember that it was the
priests doing divination who figured out that the lack of wind preventing the
Greek fleet from sailing for Troy was an expression of the anger of the
gods, and that the wind would come up if the Greeks assuaged the gods by
Agamemnon agreeing to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia.
I do not know that much about divination. It might be better to use the
church courts of the Middle Ages with their jurisdiction over family matters,
an imperium in imperio vis a vis the emerging national states. My point is
simply that if we want a religious analogy to the role of the Court in our
society, we will have to go back a ways, and we will have to choose an
analogy to a form of religious life, and a set of beliefs about what religion
is, that are quite far from mainstream American Protestantism, Judaism, or
Catholicism.
When we try to understand the role of, say, divination in ancient
Greece, or witchcraft in traditional society, it is common (let me put this
delicately) to start from the assumption that the belief of the participants in
the practical, causal efficacy of their rituals and hermeneutic techniques is
incorrect. In other words, in interpreting earlier stages of our own culture,
and some of its present aspects as well, and in interpreting many aspects of
traditional cultures, we sometimes, with more or less trepidation, just reject
the claims that the participants make about what is really going on.
We reject, with more or less trepidation, their claim that the text or
natural event (flight of birds) holds the secret of divine intentions, intentions
that are accessible through an interpretive technique. We just "do not
believe in" their gods or animist spirits, or that divinities reveal themselves
through the disposition of entrails to those who have the secret of interpreta-
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tion, or that they have intentions about specific, currently unfolding events,
or modify their intervention in those events in response to actions like
human sacrifice.
For example, we do not believe that the gods opposed the sailing of the
Greek fleet to Troy. We just reject the Greek idea that there are gods of the
type they believed in (if they really did believe in them). In so much as
they seriously attributed events to their gods' interventions in human affairs,
we tend to think they were (strong word coming) deluded. Deluded.
If we turn now to the practice of divination, we have the priestly corps
making quite specific, strong claims about what it is doing. It is using an
interpretive technique that will allow correct determination of the will of the
gods. But if there were no gods, what were they actually doing? First, they
must have been making what we cannot avoid calling mistakes. In so much
as they believed that they could understand what was happening in their
world through correct divination, and that correct divination was sometimes
accomplished, we think they were (strong word coming) deluded.
I know I am on dangerous ground here, because the American scholarly
community has no consensus about the status of claims of religious
knowledge, beyond the vague injunctions to mutual toleration I have already
mentioned. But I intend to press on across the dangerous ground. The
question I want to pose is, how do we regard those claims of United States
Supreme Court justices that look most like those of a priestly corps engaged
in divination?
More broadly, how do we regard the claims, not just of judges but of
the producers of American political ideology in newspapers and school
textbooks, that there are correct and incorrect interpretations of the
Constitution, and that one correct interpretation of the Constitution is that
the Supreme Court has legitimate power to strike down legislation that
violates the provisions of the Bill of Rights?
My belief is that those of us who more or less professionally study
American constitutionalism carefully nurture within ourselves three quite
contradictory attitudes toward this question, and that we might profit by
trying to be more precise about the jurisprudence that underlies our social
theory.
First, in commentary on constitutional history, the tone is often that the
Supreme Court is a political institution like any other, so that one asks
whether Dred Scott was wise, whether it was right or wrong in the larger
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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sense of political morality, likewise Lochner v. New York,4 Brown v. Board
of Education,5 the Nixon Tapes case,6 and so forth. In this mode, we seem
to assume that the issue of "technical legal correctness" is irrelevant or
insignificant or meaningless in deciding how we feel about what happened,
and also in interpreting the conduct of the actors. We assume that the Court
acted "politically" and is to be judged by criteria of statecraft (was the
Louisiana Purchase wise or foolish?) rather than according to a conception
that clearly differentiates its role from that of other political institutions.
Note that this approach is consistent with at least three underlying
attitudes toward judging. 1) It might be that in some cases there is a
technically correct interpretation of the law and in others there is not. In
these important cases there was not-they were of "first impression,"
perhaps-so that the Court had to proceed in the general mode of states-
manship. The judges' rhetoric of legal necessity could be understood as a
convention or a mystification. 2) It might be that there is never a technical-
ly correct solution, so that in all its work the Court proceeds "politically."
3) It might be that there is always a technically correct legal solution, which
moreover is entitled to some weight in the normal case, but fades pretty
much into insignificance in "great cases." Regardless of which of these
attitudes one adopts, in the first mode the judge is judged not by asking
whether he or she has done his or her duty by the Constitution, but whether
he or she has done the right thing in the broadest sense of what is best for
the polity.
A second attitude that is just as common and just as much in each of
us is that the Constitution expresses the commitment of the Founders to the
realization of a particular set of political ideals and principles that everyone
in our society shares or ought to share. Indeed, in this view it encompasses
all the ideals and principles that we as a collectivity subscribe to, so that
constitutional adjudication properly done is morally as well as legally
authoritative. We might say that the Constitution represents the ethical in
our political life.
Ideals and principles have to be reinterpreted over time and also have
always to be compromised to one extent or another in the face of "reality"
or "the fact of scarcity" or "human nature as it is rather than as we would
wish it to be" or "entrenched interests without ethical claims" or "practical
politics." Nonetheless, the Constitution actually has some meaning that
allows its interpreter to adopt a critical attitude toward actual social practices
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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and to find them "unconstitutional" in some other sense than just saying
"speaking as a citizen participant in American life my subjective view is that
this practice is morally and politically wrong."
A crucial point about this second view is that although it treats
constitutional adjudication in great cases as very different from crass
everyday legislative politics, and treats the Constitution itself as an
autonomous force in political culture, it places no emphasis whatever on the
merely technical correctness of important decisions. Being "faithful" to the
Constitution, in this view, is a matter of interpreting "broadly," of its
"spirit," rather than of determining the "legally correct" outcome according
to a method of legal hermeneutics clearly autonomous from the other types
of reasoning we use in deciding whether a decision is good or bad.
Yet a third attitude is that legal reasoning (not that very vague word
"law") is distinct as a way of deciding what to do in a concrete situation
from "political," and also from "principled" or ethical decision. When a
judge sets out to do legal reasoning, he or she will end up with an outcome
that may or may not correspond to the one that he or she would have
reached if asked to "do whatever he or she wanted," "make the morally
correct choice," "do what is politically expedient," and so forth. What the
Supreme Court does or ought to do in constitutional adjudication is legal
reasoning, based on the text and whatever other materials the "interpretive
community" deems "relevant."
This view that legally correct constitutional interpretation is possible is
consistent with many mutually opposing views about constitutional law.
1) You can believe that the Constitution is just great, so that deci-
sions that are technically correct interpretations are likely to or sure to be
just what you would have wanted on general moral or political philosophical
grounds. Or you can believe that the Constitution and the body of relevant
materials embody a much more partial set of ideals and principles, say those
of a "capitalist society" or a racialist or patriarchal society, so that correct
interpretations will be authoritative only for those who share the underlying
social vision.
2) You can believe in the liberal program of formal and substantive
equality plus free cultural expression, or in the organicist conservative
program of cultural and class hierarchy and authority, or in the atomist
conservative program of libertarianism restrained only by state enforcement
of a natural right to property, and still believe in correct legal reasoning,
which may or may not come out the way you personally would have wished
it to in any particular case.
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3) You can be an activist or a passivist on the issue of how and when
the Court should overrule the democratically elected legislature, and still
believe in legal correctness.
4) You can believe that all or virtually all questions presented to the
Court have right legal answers, meaning that there is a correct interpretation
of the constitutional law of the question, or that this is true only some of the
time or only occasionally.
The point is that most people most of the time hold the view that it is
at least possible on some occasions to make correct and incorrect interpreta-
tions of constitutional law, and that these times are likely to be very
important. This view coexists with the view that it is often or sometimes
if not always all "statecrat," and the view that it is a matter of the conflict
of the ethical, of ideals and principles, with tawdry reality, in each case with
the judges' claims about the legal correctness of their interpretations best
understood as convention or mystification, especially in the very important
cases.
Now let us return to the perspective of divination. What might have
happened in Aulis (treating the story as history)? The priestly corps
interpreted the auguries to mean that the reason why there was no wind was
that the Gods were angry but could be appeased by the sacrifice of
Iphigenia. We believe in neither the cause nor the cure proposed by the
diviners. But it does seem plausible that they did an interpretation, that they
and others believed in its correctness, and that they acted accordingly,
sacrificing Iphigenia, and then concluding that the ensuing wind was caused
by the gods' response to the sacrifice.
If this is what happened, there is a sense in which it was all a
"mistake." If they had understood (i.e. believed as we believe) that
sacrificing her would not in fact bring the wind, then they might not have
done it (there could well have been other motives for sacrificing her) or,
almost certainly, would have done it in some other way.
What emerges is a discontinuity between their way and our way of
understanding their history. We all agree that divination played a major role
in the events, and that as a practice and an institution it was in some sense
responsible for Iphigenia's death. Their explanation of this role, let us
suppose, was that a correct interpretive practice revealed a tragic conflict
between loyalty to the needs of the league of cities and those of the family.
Through divination Agammemnon acquired the information he needed to
make the painful choice to get the show on the road, instead of having to
sit puzzled until the energy for war had dissipated itself.
The structure of the argument by which the diviners claim to be taken
seriously is quite clear: 1) There are awesomely powerful gods. 2) They
1995]
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have intentions that are causally efficacious with regard to human affairs.
3) They are responsive to human gestures intended for them. 4) The gods
express themselves through natural phenomena like the flight of birds and
the arrangements of entrails. 5) We have a technique that will allow us to
determine their intentions and also what human gestures will modify those
intentions. 6) Any idiot can see that if we are right in what we have just
said, you had better pay attention to divination. 7) It would not be at all
surprising if you were to reverence us as well as paying attention to the
information we provide, since we are a lot closer to the gods than you are,
and what we do is pretty wonderful in itself.
We can imagine a spectrum of critical attitudes toward this piece of
diviner's history, some focussed on the gods and some on the diviners'
interpretive practices.
The critical move that denies the existence of the gods has a devas-
tating impact on the whole system of thought. Is constitutionalism, treated
as analogous to divination, vulnerable to a similar move? I think not, that
it is indeed quite well protected. We all agree that there was a framing
process and a ratification process that were historical events. It is hard to
imagine that anyone will shake our faith in the existence of the framers or
of the ratifying people in the way nineteenth century skeptics shook people's
faith in the existence of God.
On the other hand, as Peter Gabel points out, the psychological
structure of reverence and obedience seems to depend somewhat on a
fantasy. People seem to believe it is meaningful to talk about, and to
identify with a trans-temporal mythic People, so that they feel that the text
of the Constitution is an emanation of a totality in which they participate in
a way that somehow simultaneously binds and ennobles them. This looks
to me like The Nation or The Chosen People, entities that might have
sometimes for some people just lost their facticity. That might happen to
the Constitutional People as well.
While the Constitution looks like the Bible and the People like the God
of a fundamentalist religion, the situation is actually quite different.
Constitutionalism as a religion weathered, during the New Deal or legal
realism period, a crisis of belief in the possibility of understanding
interpretation as carrying out the Original Intent of the Framers, and came
back strong in the post-World War II period, with adherents of all political
tendencies.
Constitutional fundamentalism, though vulnerable to crises of belief in
the People or in Original Intent, seems destined to endure. But it coexists
with versions of constitutional faith that have achieved varying degrees of
autonomy from the Creation Myth. One such idea is that the judges are
Vol. 19
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bound not just by the Constitution but by the whole corpus of materials,
including all previous un-overruled judicial interpretations. Others are that
the Constitution "evolves," and that the "general clauses" simply call on the
judge to interpret "society's fundamental values." Although these ideas are
controversial, and experienced by fundamentalists as sophistical or airily
intellectual or dangerous, they are also probably stabilizing, somewhat in the
manner of the reduction of modem mainstream protestantism to liberal
humanist pieties.
We are now in a position to define constitutional atheism. It is the
conviction that there is no human collectivity, The People, that authors and
consents to constitutional law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Note
that atheism is perfectly consistent with the belief that there are correct and
incorrect interpretations of constitutional law.
The written document is in existence, along with the other conven-
tionally accepted materials preceding and superseding it. These documents
do not directly refer to The People in ways that would require the atheist to
believe in It in order to be able to figure out what the various human
authorities meant for her to do in the case before her. The interpretive
process may therefore generate even in the atheist the experience of closure.
A constitutional atheist could take the oath of office as a judge and promise
to abide by the Constitution, even though she thought that the underlying
beliefs that sustain the institution of constitutional interpretation are deluded.
Contrast the far more problematic situation of a diviner who has lost his
faith in the existence of the gods.
Now let us turn to the question of interpretive technique. There are a
variety of critiques that we might want to direct at the diviners' claim that
they read the flight of birds correctly, as was confirmed when the wind
came up after the sacrifice. We can begin with criticisms that are consistent
with believing that the gods exist in the way the Greeks apparently believed
they did, and that divination is possible, and then move to interpretations of
what happened that presuppose atheism.
1) In fact, the diviners did it wrong. The true interpretation was that
the gods were busy, not angry, and the wind would come up if the army just
waited. Iphigenia was sacrificed to no good purpose, since the wind would
have come up in any case. Perhaps it was an issue of skill, or of bad faith
manipulation of the auguries, or of diligence. Harvard trained diviners
would have done better.
2) This was an instance in which the auguries were undecidable.
Applying the best possible technique, the correct answer to the question
propounded was "we do not know why there is no wind and we do not
know what to do about it." The priests made a mistake in thinking they had
1995] 917
9
Kennedy: American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes of an Atheist
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
come up with a correct answer, and Iphigenia was sacrificed quite possibly
in vain, though it is also possible that the gods were in fact angry and in
fact assuaged. But if that is what happened, it was dumb luck rather than
correct divining that caused it.
3) Although divination is a valid procedure, it cannot be used on just
any old question. This was one of the class of cases in which, according to
the correct theory of divination, divination cannot work. It cannot explain
lack of wind or what to do about it. The priests were mistaken even to try
to apply their procedures in this case, because it was outside their institu-
tional competence, although of course it might in fact have been true that
the gods were angry and that they were assuaged by the sacrifice. But
again, if that is what happened, it was just luck rather than an outcome
attributable to correct divining.
If we try to understand divination as based on a delusion about the
existence of gods, or about the relationship of divine to mortal existence, a
parallel set of possibilities emerges.
4) Divination was a determinate but arbitrary procedure, just as in
critique number 1 above (the case where the issue is getting it right or
wrong). There was a right way and a wrong way to do it, but since the bird
flights or entrail arrangements interpreted were random natural events,
unrelated to any will of any divinity, if you believe in a divinity or
divinities, the divining process gave answers much like a coin flip, or trial
by battle or by torture in medieval criminal procedure. The necessity of
sacrificing Iphigenia was (let us suppose) correctly read by the diviners, but
they were doing something like correctly reading a coin as coming up
"heads" after it has been agreed that something will be decided by chance.
(Of course, in this hypothesis the power to frame the question to be decided
by chance would be extremely important.)
5) Divination was not arbitrary but rather manipulable, because the
questions posed were undecidable with the technique used (as in critiques
numbered 2 and 3 above). The diviners constantly and consciously
manipulated the interpretive technique to validate the results they wanted on
other grounds. If they said Iphigenia had to die, there was doubtless a
reason, but it certainly was not that they believed they had correctly read the
entrails or bird flight patterns. They did that after the fact, and given the
ambiguities, gaps and conflicts within the canons, were able to do it
perfectly correctly whichever way they wanted to come out.
6) Yet another possibility is that divination was not arbitrary but
rather manipulable, in what I will call the naive mode. Naive manipulation
occurs when the interpreter imposes a meaning on the materials without
experiencing her own creative part in the process. This occurs in cases of
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undecidability, like critiques 2 and 3 above. From the point of view of the
outside observer, it appears that there were two possible valid interpretations
within the canons, so that someone had to choose according to non-interpre-
tive criteria which way to go. But what occurs is more complex and
important than conscious manipulation, because the critic asserts that the
diviners experienced interpretive closure or compulsion in deciding between
the options, rather than choice.
The necessity they produced through interpretive technique was
routinely false, though not experienced as such. For this reason, it is hard
to see Iphigenia as the victim of a "simple error of interpretation." The
interpretive practice was systematically prone to the error of deciding the
undecidable. But as stated the theory does not explain why the experience
of closure emerges on one side of the choice rather than the other.
This last option, naive manipulation, is the one that strikes me as most
useful in understanding the role of the United States Supreme Court,
although I concede that it is sometimes useful to understand the justices as
proceeding in the modes of statesmanship, of the ethical and of the
technical. I think that the justices are constantly engaged in naive manip-
ulation. I am not going to try to prove this. I base it on my personal
experience as a law clerk to Potter Stewart in the 1970-1971 Term, and on
twenty years of studying Supreme Court opinions. Let us just pretend I
have shown it to be true. What would be the consequences for our under-
standing of the role of the court in our society?
Let us call the combination of constitutional atheism and the belief that
naive manipulation is at least common if not omnipresent CONSTI-
TUTIONAL SKEPTICISM. If constitutional skepticism is valid, our usual
understandings of American political history and culture are problematic.
The problem is if the Constitution cannot be understood as the will of
The People, but rather of the humans who wrote it and got it ratified, and
if naive manipulation has been common in interpreting it, then what
intelligible order has the judicial process of imposing the indicated outcomes
through state force brought to our political history, and how has it
contributed to the warp and woof of our political culture? Big questions,
but here goes.
First, it is important to see what answers are undermined through the
hypothesis of skepticism. So long as we believe in the constitutional people
and that the interpretive process was done correctly or incorrectly, in good
faith or through conscious manipulation, we could understand our constitu-
tional history in the modes of patriotism and morality.
Patriotism. Our Constitution expresses our particular qualities as a
people, and its interpretation and enforcement against conflicting norms
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sustain those qualities. Constitutional interpretation is therefore a mode of
national self-determination. We can distinguish two ways in which we have
a national identity that sets us apart from other nations: 1) Constitu-
tionalism itself is peculiarly American-others do not engage in our
particular form of self-determination through interpretation, preferring either
violent or merely political modes instead. 2) The particular constellation of
civil and personal rights and liberties we enjoy derive from our particular
constitutional scheme adapted through time to our changing values. If we
have been, are and, God willing always will be the freest people in the
world, we achieved this by adopting a freedom-guaranteeing constitution and
then interpreting and enforcing it as cases arose.
Morality. Our Constitution embodies the moral commitments of our
highest, most idealistic selves. Politics is fallen Earth in relation to the
Heaven of constitutional aspirations. True constitutional interpretation is
therefore a kind of angelic intervention into the affairs of everyday life. We
submit to it in actual, coercive fact to attain a virtue that we would not have
the strength or imagination or resources to achieve if left to our normal
political practices. False interpretation may be mistaken, in which case we
lose this benefit, or consciously manipulative, in which case the profane
invades the divine sphere, corrupting it. Constitutional history is that of the
gradual extension of heavenly sway, as the court has protected but also
expanded basic civil and human rights in the face of the aggressions and
resistances of politics.
I will not develop the point that constitutional skepticism is pretty
devastating for both the patriotic and the moralistic version of what the
interpretive process does for us. Here I will simply list what seem to me
some hypothetical contributions of constitutionalism that we could believe
in even as skeptics.
1) Constitutionalism has had a disordering or randomizing effect on
our political history. This occurs because naive manipulation is an activity
open to influence by all kinds of agendas, including, obviously the political
agenda of the judge. The political process puts judges in office and leaves
them there, possessed of this stock of legitimacy or mana or religious
plausibility for the mass of believers, and no way to avoid, while engaged
in naive manipulation, the use of it to keep dead programs alive or create
new ones. A useful analogy may be the British civil service, or the corps
of prefects in France. The difference may be the bizarre impact of
self-delusion on the implementation of the political agenda by the judge, and
the irrational, non-dialogic, almost mechanical translation of constitutionalist
faith into popular obedience. All this can be good or bad, depending on
who is in charge and what he or she is trying to accomplish.
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2) Constitutionalism has been a constitutive element of our political
culture, not as the form for our collective self-determination but by
providing one of the discourses through which actors pursue their political
and ethical projects. These projects can be good or bad, depending on who
is pursuing them and what they are after. Different discourses, different
cultures has got to be our maxim as soon as we lose faith in the possibility
of transparent language. We might very loosely analogize constitutionalism
to the Sun Dance of the Sioux, which is both a ritual and the site of a
discourse as well. Naive manipulation then becomes just another of the
utterly culturally specific ways in which people are in bad faith.
3) Constitutionalism made legal realism possible. Conservative
control of the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, in a context of
naive manipulation, created a vested interest for the progressives in
demystifying legal reason. Because the stakes were higher than in Europe,
where all the roots of realism lay, the enterprise was taken much further.
Just as fascism and stalinism were making the realist impulse look positively
obscene in Europe, the American realists reaped the reward of their general
critique of Classical legal thought, epitomized by the work of Holmes,
Hohfeld, Hale, the Cohens, Arnold, and Llewellyn. The essence of this
critique was that because the private law issue of how to define property
rights was undecidable given the extant interpretive techniques, conserva-
tives must renounce public law power to strike progressive legislation as
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